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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,
Plaimtiff,
vs.
LOCAL UNION 967, JOINT COUNCIL 67, WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS, THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD oF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFF E U R S , WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,
AFL-CIO, MILO B. RASH, CLARENCE LOTT, AND JOSEPH w.
BALLEW,
Defendants.

CASE NO.
8823

APPELLANTS' REPLY TO
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
ARGUMENT
Point No. I.
Concerted Action
Respondent first quotes from the record and emphasizes that the ne~al employer (.as distinguished from
the neutral employees) was indeed appealed to, which,
of course, appellants admit. Respondent then proceeds
1
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to deny that Harry Rosen was a supervisor, conceding
instead that he was a foreman. Regardless of how Harry
Rosen is labeled, the facts remain as they appear in the
record and as quoted on Page 47 of appellants' brief,
wherein Harry Rosen testifies as elicited by Mr. Arthur
Allen that he was employed as a supervisor and that he
supervised the loading and unloading of merchandise in
and out of Dorman's place of business and further that
he was indeed .a supervisor of the only other employee
of Dorman referred to in the record: Mr. Nigro.
Respondent failed to show in its brief any appeal
by the Union to anyone other than Harry Rosen. It is
therefore somewhat perplexing when they add that witnesses Fredrico and Gywallskog make it ''crystal clear
that Dorman's employees refused to unload the cheese
and that these refusals extended from July 26 through
September 7. ''
Now, the facts are that neither Fredrico or Gywellskog were present during, nor do they testify about,
the events of July 26 and 27 when the picketing took
place - at least the only picketing which can in any
way be attributed to the defendants. There w.as no
picketing whatsoever on Septe1nber 7 when these two
witnesses drove into the New York dock with their load.
Neither of these two witnesses refer at all to an
attempt by any of the defendants to influence Donnan's
employees to concerted action. On transcript page 151,
Fredrico testifies .as follows:
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''Harry Rosen said, 'What are you fellows doing
here~' Art was the senior truck driver and said, 'We
are here with a load of cheese.' Harry said, 'I can't
unload you, you'll have to wait until the Dormans get
here.' Q: What did you do after that~ A: vVe wait~d
for the Dormans and the Dormans came down and said,
•We will have to call the Union '* * * ' and he called the
Union, and, I guess he didn't get no result, so Art,
the senior truck driver, asked Mr. Dorman if he could
speak to the shop steward, and he said, 'Sure.' I called
the shop steward, Harry, and Art asked them, 'Could
you fellows unload the cheese~' Art said, 'No, we can't
the Union won't let us." The witness here fails so say
what Harry told Art. But Art, not Harry (Rosen) said
"No, we can't [unload], the Union won't let us." If this
hearsay statement ·of Art is true, the Union referred to
was neither of the defendants, for the picketing of the
defendants was limited to July 26 and 27. The witness
here refers only to Harry Rosen, the supervisor, and Mr.
Dorman. An employee is not mentioned.
Thus, Respondent hasn't yet shown us any evidence
that appellants attempted to influence Dorman's employees to engage in concerted action as a means of
accomplishing their object.
Next, respondent quotes from the testimony of Mr.
Gossner (page 89), who says that Victor Dorman told
him that "our employees don't want to unload any more
Dairy Distributors' cheese. Don't send any more with
Dairy Distributors' trucks.''
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This is hearsay and self-serving, and quite contrary
to the facts. So let's see what Victor Dorman actually
says. Mr. Allen is interrogating Victor Dorman as to the
events of July 26 - the day of the very brief picketing
by defendant, Joint Council 67. Mr. Allen asks Dorman
if he had a conversation with Mr. Ristuccia, the head
of the local in Dorman's area. "A: In the late afternoon,
I believe the very same day he was in our building,
and during the course of conversation, I mentioned the
fact that he had stopped our truck. He said, 'I did not
stop your truck.' I said, 'That is not so; you did stop
the truck; 1ny men were willing to unload it; and if
you didn't stop it, it would have been unloaded.' He
said, 'I didn't stop it.' I said, 'Are you saying that you
are not stopping the truck~' He said, 'I am not saying
anything.' Whereupon, I instructed the loader and my
men to unload the truck, and we ordered it back from
the parking lot to our front door and unloaded it'."
It is obvious here that Victor Dorman is not being
influenced by his employees- that in fact the employees
needed only to be told by Dorman what to do and
they did it.
What is apparent from this is that Dorman was
greatly influenced by the man who was in charge of
the New York Local and w.as altogether too ready to
assume that Mr. Ristuccia had taken a position which
in fact he hadn't taken. That Dorman would have been
influenced by what Ristucca

m~gkt

request is under-

standable because he it is with whom Dorman negotiates
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contracts concerning all of the Donnan employees, who
numbered approximately sixty-five p€Ople.
\Ve emphasize that the .above quoted testimony of
Victor Dorman in no way indicates that Dorman's employees were concerting to induce Dorman to prevail
upon Gossner. On the contrary, it necessarily shows only
one fact: That the employees were entirely subserviant
to the desires and demands of their employer - which
of course destroys the entire foundation of respondent's
claim of liability.
The reason the unloader employees, if there were
any, did not unload the cheese during the brief periods
when the trucks were not unloaded, is that they followed
the instructions of supervisor, Harry Rosen, who said,
"I refused to unload it." (Tr. 132, L3, 17-19). So when
respondent makes the point that Dormans never told
the employees not to unload, it is probably true that,
if there were ·any such employees to be so instructed,
they were not instucted directly by the Dormans; but
they certainly were so instructed by and through their
supervisor, Harry Rosen.
That the picketing did influence the Dorman brothers
appears evident from the ready assumption which Victor
Dorman made that Ristuccia was in some way involved
in the picketing. The picketing had its effect directly upon
the employer. It was not an inducement to concerted
action of the employees.
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CERTIFICATION
Respondent says "The second announced purpose
of the appellants was to force Gossner as manager of
the Cache Valley Dairy Association to recognize and
bargain with the Local Union in Ogden as the representative of his employees. This they could not lawfully do
unless they had been certified as the representative of
aid employees under the provisions of the Act.'' This
last sentence does not meet the argument in Appellant's
brief wherein we say that an actual, existing bargaining
status of a union plus subsequent official recognition
thereof by the Board is at least the equivalent of being
certified by the Board. Concerning the balance of the
above quoted statement, it was never our ''announced
purpose" or our purpose at all to force Gossner to
"recognize" the Ogden Local as bargaining representative. The purpose the Union had was to get Gassner
to bargain. The Union was already recognized, and all
that we have said in our brief in distinguishing these
concepts appears not to haYe been understood by respondent. The difference between getting Gossner to
recognize the Union and getting Gossner to bargain
with the Union which had a recognized status, is the
crux of tllis problem. Being recognized as the bargaining agent and getting Gossner to bargain "ith that
agent are two vastly different things.
The Board itself recognized this difference when it
observed the Ogden Loc.al 's recognized status and then
ordered Gossner to Bargain with that Union.
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Respondent then says that it is a strange rule of
law which would permit a Union to be a bargaining agent
for employees when membership in that Union was
"suspended" by the Union, confirmation of which, respondent says, appeared in the picket sign where the
employees were referred to as ''non union employees.''
If this is strange law, then the Taft Act itself must
be considered strange law because it is a necessary conclusion of Sections 8(b) (1) (A) and of 14(b) that it is
quite possible for a situation to develop wherein a union
may represent a group of employees as its collective bargaining agent without a single one ,of those employees
being a union member.
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) provides that: "This paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to acquisition or
retention of membership therein.'' As long as the rules
are uniformly applied to all employees it's conceivable
that the bargaining agent may have to "suspend" its
members if they failed to comply with the rules, as for
example the payment of dues, which, in fact, were not
being paid by Gossner's employees during the period
of time in question. Whether a bargaining agent remains a bargaining agent and whether an employee
remains a union member are determined by rules respectively which are quite different, and in no way is
one dependent upon the other as respondent infers.
Furthermore, Utah has a "Right to Work" law,
which the Taft Act permits under 14 (b) of the Act.

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Section 10 (34-16-10, UCA) of that Act appears, however, to be an exercise of a power which Section 14 (b)
failed to grant the State because it says, ''No employer
shall require any person to pay any dues, fees, or other
charges of any kind to any labor union*** as a condition
of employment.'' Section 14 (b) reads:
''Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership i·n a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State
or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.''
Thus, the power granted to the States is limited to
the prohibiting of ''agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization." In the Utah Statute, such a
requirement concerning membership is found in Section
9 of the State law. Assuming Section 10 deals with a
subject which the Federal Act pre-empts as expressed
by the Indiana Superior Court in the recent case of
Meade Electric Company vs. Hagberg, (.Jfay 19, 1958),
42 LRR~f 2124, then in Utah, it is quite possible for a
union, as the collective bargaining agent for a group
of employees, to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the mnployer and have a clause therein for the
payment of dues to the bargaining agent as con1pensation
for its bargaining services, with no requiren1ent whatsoever for those employees to becmne n1e1nbers of the union.
We would have a situation that is popularly known as an
"agency shop." The J.ll eade Electric Company case,
supra, gives us a well-reasoned and highly instructive
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opinion on this subject which quotes significantly from
the debates which preceded the Taft Act.
Whether a union represents a group of employees
as their bargaining agent rests upon legal requiren1ents
quite different from 1nembership requirements in that
unwn even though this may, indeed, seem strange to
some.
Since the Board had already ordered Gossner to
recognize the Ogden Local 976, it was no business of
the employer if there had been friction between the
Union and the employees. Actually there is little if any
evidence of any such friction, but if there were, it was
an issue entirely irrelevant to the question as to who
was the employees' bargaining agent. If there were
friction between the employees and their bargaining
agent of a nature which was indeed harming the employees bargaining interest, it certainly was not a matter
about which the employer should, or even want to, complain. It was none of his concern. NLRB vs. Sansone
Hosiery Mills, cited in Appellants' brief.
AMBULATORY PICKETING
Respondent begins its argument on this point by
saying in effect that appellants' claim that they c.an
violate the law with impunity and that they, therefore,
make the law a nullity. This, of course, is not what
appellants say. We say that where a business uses its
own vehicles and its own drivers to move its own product,
that vehicle and driver may be followed and picketed
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wherever it comes to rest, because the picketing of the
truck, or ambulatory situs, is primary picketing; and if a
neutral employer at a "0ommon situs" is affected such
effects are incidental and do not violate the Act. NLRB v.
Service Trade Chauffeurs (Teamsters) 191 F. 2d 65, 28
LRRM 2450.
Respondent further fails to shed any light on the
problem by saying, "The law does not sanction picketing
for an unlawful purpose,'' with which we agree. In quoting from page 63, 64 of appellants' brief, respondent
·takes the quoted statement out of context and places an
interpretation thereon that was not intended by appellants. Appellants' brief proceeds to show that ambulatory
picketing is primary picketing and is therefore lawful
even though incidental adverse efects may result to a
neutral employer because of the influence such picketing
may have upon the neutral employees. Actually, we
reiterate, that in this case there were no such incidental
effects upon the neutral employees, but even if there
were, we say that such effects would have been only
incidental to the la-wful, prin1ary picketing, and therefore
the picketing itself would be lawful.
In quoting the luteruatioual Rice J.l!illiug Case in
thej r brief appellants recognized the factual differences
involved, hut WP contend that in spit of the factual differelwes, the particular reference of the U.S. Supreme
.Court in that ea~p as to what does not constitute con<'erted action is Y(~ry pertinent. If there had been any
proof in the instant ca~e of a group of neutral en1ployees
10
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being influenced by the picketing itself, then we agree
that the factual differences would have raised a question
as to the appropriateness of that citation but without
any such evidence, we believe the following statement is
apropos here:
''A sufficient answer to this claimed violation of the section is that the Union's picketing
and its encouragement of the men on the truck
did not amount to such an inducement or encouragement to 'concerted' activity as the section
proscribes. While each case must be considered in
the light of its surrounding circumstances, yet
the applicable proscriptions of Paragraph 8 (b)
(4) are expressly limited to the inducement or
encouragement of concerted conduct by the employees of the neutral employer.''
After applying the rule to the facts 1n that case
and finding no concert, the Court continues :
''In this case therefore we need not determine
the specific objects toward which a Union's encouragement of concerted conduct must be directed in order to amount to an unfair labor practice under subsection (A) or (B) of 8 (b) (4)."
We add this last quote of the Supreme Court to
emphasize what we have heretofore argued which is that
the principle of law is that plaintiffs must prove concert
of action among neutral employees regardless of the
nature or dissimilarity of the facts; and unless the plaintiff does prove such, there is no need or purpose to look
at the problem of the objects of the picketing because
the concert problem is a prerequisite of ,all else that

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

follows in the Act, all of which we have developed in
our brief.
Respondent next objects to appellants' interpretation of the Schultz Refdgerated Service case as applied.
to the instant case. They then proceed to enumerate
the significant factual points of that case. We fail to
see where any of these points would not fit the essentials
of the instant case.
GOSSNER'S UNIFIED OPERATIONS
Respondent next appears to use the Campbell Coal
case and the Service Trade Chauffeurs case as a weapon
against appellants, based on the assumption that the
Cache Valley Dairy Association was the primary employer and that the plaintiff, the Dairy Distributors, Inc.
was not a primary employer but was a secondary company. The appellant has adopted the view, as did the trial
court, that since Gossner was the sole owner, manager,
employer and actual operator of both operations which
processed and transported the cheese, .and since these
operations, although technically under separate legal
entities, were completely integrated and interdependent~
they must be regarded as a single operation for the
purpose of the Taft Act. Respondent appears now to
be challenging this proposition.
A leading Board case in support of appellants' new
is Marine Cooks .and Stewards - (Irwin-Lyons Lun1ber
Company), 25 LRRl\f 1092. In this ease a lumber company cut the trees in the forest and processed tl1en1 at
12
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its saw mill. A separate public utility transport company
transported the logs from the forest to the mill. The
stock ownership .and managerial control of both companies were vested in the same individuals. When a labor
dispute arose with the lumber company, a union, instead
of picketing the lumber company, picketed the transportation company. The transportation company stopped its
operations, and secondary boycott charges were filed
against the union. In clearing the union of the charges
the Board emphasizes that the stock ownership .and managerial control were vested, substantially, in the same
individuals, ''and that both companies are, in effect,
engaged in 'one straight line operation,' i.e., the Lumber
Company cuts the logs, the Boom Company transports
the logs down the river, and the Lumber Company saws
the logs into lumber at the mill. On the basis of these
facts * * the Boom Company is not a neutral or wholly
unconcerned employer. * * * We therefore conclude * * '~
that the Respondent Unions h.ave not violated Section
8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act."
The same factors which point to unified activity
where unions are charged with unfair practices, have
been applied also where employers are so charged. In
the Board case of Condenser Coporation, 6 LRRM 203
(modified and enforced by CA 3, 10 LRRM 483) the
Board cited common ownership and control of labor relations matters as a ground for holding that a corporation
was the employer of its subsidiary's employees for the
purposes of the Act. And again the Board held a cor-
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porate garment manufacturer responsible for unfair
labor practices committed by a corporate contractor in
view of the ownership and control of both corporations
by members of the same family and the close integration
of their operations ( NLRB vs. Somerset Classics Inc.,
26 LRRM 1376; enforced by CA 2, 29 LRR~i 2331; cert.
denied by U.S. Sup. Ct., 30 LRRM 2711).
Since respondent now premises some of its basic
arguments on the idea that Gossner's respective cheese
processing and transporting business entities are essentially separate activities for purposes of the Act, we feel
it is appropriate to show that, as far as the Act is concerned, not only did Gossner's "straight line" activity
include Cache Valley Dairy Association and Dairy Distributors Inc., but also included the Dorman business in
New York.
The dairymen, including dairyman Gossner, furnish
milk to the cheese processing plant at Amalga, Utah,
then Gossner, who pro1noted, and was the n10ving force
in, the Association, ( tr. 8, 9) processes the 1nilk ''ith his
own employees and at his own expense into S\\iss cheese
at said plant, where, it is elai1ned, Gossner produces
lllOl'<' ~\ri~s cheese than any place on earth; then approxinlatel~· 50<;~ of eYerything Gossner produced was transported to Donnan's, son1e by Dairy Distributor. trucks,
~onw hy Caclw \ .. aliPy Dairy . Assoeiation trucks, some by
~onunon cnrriPr trucks. It appears that it was entirely
Uostwr 's dPcision and responsibility as to which 1neans
of' transportation was to be used, for the Association
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meinbers wanted Gassner to assume the job (tr 12).
Under the contract Gassner had with the Association,
he was to devote his entire time to the business and at
their request he was now including in the business the
transport activity (tr. 12). Gassner received 15% of the
gross profits, which meant that Cache Valley Dairy Association absorbed .all losses including losses from market
fluctuations while Gassner assumed no risk ·Of loss, even
when Dairy Distributors ''purchased'' cheese from Cache
Valley Dairy Association, as will hereinafter appear. All
orders by Dorman for Amalga cheese were placed with
Gassner, who sometimes would bill via Cache Valley
Dairy Association, and sometimes via Dairy Distributors •
Inc. Dormans neither knew nor cared whether it was to
come from one or the other. ( tr 290-295) Their only concern was to get the cheese. The amount of cheese purchased by Dorman from Gassner was of such volume as
to be of great importance to Dorman so that they could
not even consider the prospect of doing without it. Both
Gassner and Dorman left no doubt that each was indispensible to the other. (tr 16, 337).
This fact becomes even more clear from the facts
which appear in the affidavit of Dean Corbett. This affidavit indicates that on September 30, 1953, N. Dorman
and Company loaned Dairy Distributors Inc. $25,000.00
The loan was not paid back until January 21, 1956, during
the liquidation of the plaintiff Con1pany (and not in
January of 1955 which is inadvertently stated in error in
the affidavit). There is no record of any interest pay-
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menton this loan. Such a loan is understandable only in
view of a closely unified and integrated operation between Gossner and Dorman.
At the center of the entire operation was one man
who could and did direct every activity between Cache
Valley Dairy Association in Utah and N. Dorman and
Company in New York. The unity between Dormans and
Dairy Distributors, Inc., as great as it was, was, of
course, not the completely unified thing "\Vhich existed
between Dairy Distributors, Inc. and the cheese proces. sing part of Cache Valley Dairy Association. Illustrative of the key role Gossner played, and the power
he had to manipulate the operation between the latter
two business entities is the practice, as shown by said
affidavit, that when the cheese was transferred from
Cache Valley Dairy Association to Dairy Distributors
Inc., it was never paid for until after it was delivered
to Dorman, and Dorman had paid Dairy Distributors
Inc. or Gossner direct. Then and then only was Cache
Valley Dairy Association paid. There were no instruments of security drawn for Cache Valley Dairy ~lssocia
tion 's benefit to protect it. during the interim period. It
need hardly be said that Caehe Yalley Dairy Association
would never have permitted this if Gossner himself, for
all practieal purposes. was not. in fact, c01npletely identified as both Caehe Valley D.airy ~\ssociation and Dairy
Distributor~ Inc. Fr01n production at An1alga, Utah to
marketiJ?.g at Dorn1ans in New York and the transportin~
hd wcPn, this was, indeed, a ''straight line operation··,
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.and picketing one place is the same as picketing the other,
because it's all essentially the same business with each
segment wholly dependent upon the other. We can say
with certainity that the unification is complete as between Cache Valley Dairy Association .and Dairy Distributors Inc. so far as the Act is concerned. And we
believe it is also fair to say of Dormans tie-in with
Gossner what the Board said of the Boom Company in
the Irwin-Lyons Case: It is ''not .a neutral or wholly
unconcerned employer.''
Next, respondent says that appellant fell into the
same error with respect to the Moore Dry Dock case
and again stresses that Dairy Distributors, Inc. "was
not the primary employer .at the situs or at all'' and ''that
the picketing clearly discloses (from the signs thernselves) that the dispute was clearly not with Dairy Distributors, Inc. but with the primary employers, Cache
Valley Dairy Association. The above cited cases and
.argument answer this point of respondent's. From where
the Union could observe the Gossner operations, Gossner
employed both the cheese processors and the truck
drivers who hauled the cheese. He completely controlled
both operations. So to the Union, the operation, whether
under the name of Cache Valley Dairy Association or
Dairy Distributors, Inc. was plainly .and simply Gossner
-no one else.
AMBULATORY PICKETING -

Continued

Next, respondent grapples with the real problems
involved in ambulatory picketing. In this field of the
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law distinctions are finely drawn and it is obvious thac
the Courts, as we mentioned in our brief, have found
this p.art of the Act to be not without its problems of
interpretation and application. V'l e again emphasize that
the jury was given no satisfactory guide as to how to
apply the law to the f.acts. We believe, however, that the
analysis of the problem which we now propose, in view
of the cases which respondent cites, will show that appellants should be given a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
First, we reiterate that if the Court sees, as we do, a
complete failure to prove any inducement of neutral employees to concerted action, there is no need to consider
the problem of ambulatory picketing. This problem can
be present only after such inducen1ent has been established.
The ~Ioore Dry Dock case is an important landmark
case because it gives .an essential guide which Congress
failed to supply and because the Circuit Courts of ~1..p
peal .and the U.S. Supre1ne ·Court have seen its good
sense and have approved it. ~1..lthough supplying a valuable guide a~ this ease did, it neYertheless 1nade the applieation of its rules no le~s technical or difficult to the
fad nal va rietiPs to cOiue up for decision. ~1..s the personnell of the Board has changed in recent years, it would
.app<>ar to son1e that the Board has been deYeloping a
rP~t rid ivP ft'ndpney ag-ainst picketing aetivity, encroaching, a~ it is believPd, upon the rights reserved to unions
in paragraph 13 of tl1e Aet. This restrictive tendency is
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well noted by the Fifth Circuit Court in the Sales
Drivers case (37 LLRM 2166), wherein the Court refused
to approve the Board's too "rigid rule."
This "rigid rule'' is: That if the primary employer
had a permanent place of business at which picketing
can be effectively carried on, any picketing must be
limited to such a place, even though there are places
elsewhere where the company does business at a common
site with other workers; and this rule applies even though
picketing at the common situs conforms to the Moore
Dry Dock formula. The Fifth Circuit Court refuses to
accept such a rigid rule and states that:
"Section 8 (B) (4) (A) does not contain a
provision which condemns concerted .activity of
employees with respect to their own employer
merely because it occurs at a place where it comes
to the attention of and incidentally affects employees of another, even where the activity could
be carried on at a place where the primary employer .alone does business. The existence of a
common site, of such incidental effect, and of
another place which can be picketed, are factors
to be considered in determining whether or not
the section has been violated, but alone are not
conclusive. The presence of these factors does not
warrant a failure to consider other facts which
are relevant and perhaps countervailing."
The particular "countervailing" factors in this
Sales Drivers case were that the drivers of the trucks
spent 25 per cent of their working time .at their employer's permanent plants, 25 per cent enroute, and 50 per
cent at construction sites. Such factors, said the Court,
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warranted picketing at the common situs and if such
picketing complied with the Moore Dry Dock criteria, it
would be lawful even if neutrals were adversely affected.
Now, if all the primary employees always work at
the permanent situs and no percentage of their time is
spent away from it, or if they are all there at least a
part of every working day, then that is an important
factor which would weigh heavily against the lawfulness
of picketing elsewhere. But here again we should not
like to see a rigid rule adopted saying that such a
factor is necessarily conclusive, although such appears
to be a most important, if not conclusive, factor in the
Associated 1Iusicians case and the United Steel \Yorkers
case which respondent cites. In the Associated Musicians
case, none of the musicians ever appeared at the common
situs. In the United Steel \Yorkers case all the empoyees
concerned were continuously employed at the permanent
situs. These are crucial differences which distinguish
these cases from the instant ease, and it should be remembered that this is an area of law where fine distinctions are, indeed, controlling.

.A~ a source for this rigid rule, the Board relies upon
own decision in the \Yashington Coca Cola Bottling
c·:u~P, 33 L'R~I 11~. In tl1at case as ''ith the Sales
Drivers en~<'. thP per1uanent place of business and the
c•.om11wn situs wrrP within the san1e conununity or general
an•a. when• if picketing i~ done at one place, it is reasonahl<' to ~u ppo~r it would be newsworthy in the entire
<·omn1uni ty and therefore, says the Board, picketing need
it~
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only be performed at the permanent situs because it
would become a matter of common knowledge in the
entire area eoncerned, and the primary employees would
thus be informed of the dispute. As seen, the Sales
Drivers case rejects this restrictive view. Thus, the Board
but not the Circuit Court, has made the distance between
the permanent situs and the common situs .an important
factor, a factor which was also referred to in the Schultz
Refrigerated case. In the Schultz case, importance was
attached to the f.act that the respective sites were in different states, and it was said that since the permanent
situs was in New Jersey, it made sense to permit picketing of the trucks in New York where it appears the trucks
always stayed.
In the case now before the Court, the distance between the two sites was 2000 miles. The respondent's
drivers were constantly on the move between Smithfield
and New York, and it would take as much as two weeks
for a round trip when a single driver was used. Any
advertising of the dispute at the permanent situs might
take as much as two weeks to get the message to the
drivers carrying this long haul, and getting the message
to the drivers was the important thing, because transportation was the key to Gossner 's successful operation
and we believe it is a too rigid rule to say that the union
cannot choose its place to picket as between where the
cheese is loaded or unloaded, especially in view of the
''straight line'' operation involved here, and the great
distance between the two points.
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But there is a 1nore important reason for picketing
the truck on a public street at the Dorman entrance. It
is that the Union wanted to notify the public in New
York and thereby prevail directly upon Dorman- not
through Dorman's employees. The appellants knew that
the Dorn1an brothers were sensitive to public opinion
concerning the source of the cheese they were marketing
in New York, and that Dorman was also sensitive to what
the local union leader, Ristuccia, might think if it were
advertised to the public by picketing that Dorman was
buying ''hot" cheese. Dorman did not want this made
public ( tr :246). That it was an inescapable conclusion
that this was Dorman's only concern of the picketing
and that he was not concerned about what any employee
might think is made evident when one reflects that
every load of cheese was unloaded exactly when Dorman
ordered it, and that there was no doubt in Dorman's mind
that every load of cheese which was yet to come from
Gossner, whether by Dairy Distributor, Inc. or Cache
Valley Dairy Association, would continue to be unloaded
as ordered (tr 298, 299). By picketing a vehicle on wheels
on a public street within all the standards of the Moore
Dry Dock case, appellants pursued a legal right reserved
to them by the Act.
While appellants firmly believe that the evidence
warrants a determination by this ·Court that the picketing in this case w.as an1bulatory, primary picketing as
a matter of law, we now conclude this part of our
rebuttal .argtnnent with the observation that it was
palpable error for the Trial Court to submit the
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case to the jury without an instruction involving the
Moore Dry Dock criteria, which instruction was requested by appellants, but denied by the trial court.
Point No. II
Under Point II of plaintiff's brief, it states:
"Joseph Ballew testified that he was in Utah
as an employee and representative of the Western
States Dairy Employees Council, a division of
the Western Conference of Teamsters." (tr 141)
"Ballew by his own statement was in Utah
as a representative of the Western Conference
to assist local unions 'in negotiation of contracts,
disputes or strikes of employees' rights'." ( tr
142)

An examination of the record at page 141 or page
142 and allother pages fails to show a statement that
Ballew was an employee or agent of the Western Conference of Teamsters.
In order for plaintiff to recover a valid judgment
against the Western Conference of Teamsters, it must
prove three principle points, to wit:
1. That the Western Conference of Teamsters was
a labor union 'Or organization within the statutory definition.
2. That Ballew was an agent of the Western Conference of Teamsters.
3. That Ballew acted within the scope of his employment as an agent of the Western Conference of
Teamsters.
23
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The burden is upon plaintiff to prove all three of
the above vital points. The constitution of the Western
Conference of Teamsters was not introduced. If it had
been, we would perhaps have known whether employees
participated in the Western Conference of Teamsters'
affairs or whether the Conference was empowered to
bargain. No member of the Western Conference of
Teamsters testified. If the Conference is composed of
employee members or had members at all they probably
would have known the purposes and functions of the
Conference. No officer was produced to testify whether
the Conference had members or whether employees participated or whether the Conference existed for the
purpose in whole or in part in dealing with employers
concerning labor disputes and wages, etc. as the statutory
definition requires. The record is silent in such respect
except for the negative testimony of Ballew, who was
produced by the plaintiff and testified:
''It (The Western Conference of Teamsters)
isn't .a labor union as such. It doesn't negotiate or
anything of that nature." (tr 150)
Both Messrs. Ballew .and Rash testified for plaintiff and both testified Ballew was an mnployee of the
Western States Dairy Employee Council. (tr 126 and
141)
No witness testified that Mr. Ballew was an employee or agent of the Western Conference of Teamsters or that Ballew at any time at all ever assumed
to act or acted in the scope of his employment as an agent
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or employee of the Western Conference of Teamsters
before, during or after the time Joint Council 67 picketed
the Gossner truck on the public street adjacent to the
Dorman Plant. The plaintiff's cause in such respect
being tied to Ballew, it failed upon all three 8ignal
points.
Plaintiff cites the case of International Long Shoreman's Union vs. Hawaiian Pineapple Company, :226
Federal 2nd, 875, 37 LLRM 2056. We have read the case
carefully. It was enmeshed in a back ground of some
violence and if we have a ticket on plaintiff's train of
though; there is no comfort in that case for plaintiff. On
the contrary one Matt Meeham was the principal actor
and the Court instructed the jury as a matter of law
that Meeham and four others were representatvves and
agents of the IL U. The Court significantly stated a Horn
book agency principal, applicable in such behalf as follows:
Of course the Local and International abstractedly could do nothing. Things, if done by
them, had to be done by officers, agents or members then authorized or subsequently rati;fiJed."
(emphasis ours)
The case of United Mine Workers of America vs.
Patton, 211, Fed. 2nd 272, is cited by plaintiff. We have
also studied that case and on the question of damages
it is fatal to the theory of damages upon which this
cause was submitted to the jury; and on the question of
agency the Court holds that the International was en25
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gaged in organizing independent mines through its District 28 field men. In other words, District 28 and District
50 and the United Mine Workers of America are the
same thing, the Court held.
Regardless of what the facts may or may not be,
the Court and the parties here are bound by this record,
hut it is pretty much a matter of public notice that
United Mine Worker Districts are the organizing arms
of the International. Whereas, in the Teamster organization, the conferences, councils and locals function in
their respective spheres by themselves and for the most
part entirely independent of any other organization in
or out of the teamster establishment. Hence, when a
field man calls a strike as was done in the Patton case,
that was the act of the International and the Court so
held. If a teamster council finds itself shorthanded and
wants to borrow a picket from a sister organization to
advertise a greivance and Lott is borrowed from Teamster Local 983 (which for some reason was not sued) and
Ballew borrowed fr01n the Western States Dairy Employees Council (which also ·was not sued); such call for
assistance, does not make or create liability on the part
of Local Union 983, or the Western States Dairy Employees Council, simply because such local and such
council responded to a request for help, and such person so loaned was expressly and exclusively under the
direction and control of the lo.anee while so on loan.
Respecting the sueability of the International
Union, plaintiff has stressed the idea that this record
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shows that Local Union 976, the Western States Dairy
Employees Council, the Western Conference of Teamsters and the Teamster International Union are one and
the same thing. Possibly, upon the theory that :L\Iurray is
a part of or an affiliate of Utah or the United States.
Significantly, plaintiff omits to connect the International Union with the party and the only party that
engaged in the picketing; namely, Joint Council 67. Lott
and Rash were officers of Joint Council 67, but under
common law agency rules this alone does not make the
different respective local unions of which they were
respective sercetaries, responsible for the action of the
Joint Council in this case.
There is nothing in the record that discloses that the
International does, c.an or may collect dues or per capita
tax from the Joint Council or that it does, can or may
control its affairs or ever attempted to. The presumption
from this record is that Joint Council 67 pays dues and
per capita tax to no one, that no one on the outside
interferes with its functions and decisions, that it is a
complete and fully officered organization unto itself, that
it has certain duties to perform and performs them
strictly independent of the International and entirely
without its consent or knowledge.
Upon what theory the trial court refused to dismiss
the International after making the observation it did
(tr 341), we do not know, but certainly it was not upon
any valid theory of agency or otherwise that had been
brought to our attention. The only membership that
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could possibly act from a concerted standpoint was that
of Local 277, which local took no action and did no picketing. Lott was secretary of Local 983 but it did no picketing. Rash was Secretary of Local 976 and it did no
picketing. Ballew was on loan from the Western State~
Dairy Employees Council and it did no picketing. The
picketing that occurred w.as engaged in by the Joint
Council only, and an examination of the record discloses
no connection between the International Union and the
Joint Council, or that the International Union was even
aware of what the Joint Council was doing.
Wherefore, we respectfully submit the refusal of
the Court to dismiss the International Union from this
cause, was manifest error.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARENCE M. BECK
A. PARK SMOOT
and
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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